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-3I. Introduction
Cross-subsidies are often considered the principal mechanism1 through which hospitals
provide otherwise unprofitable care (Phelps, 1986; Norton and Staiger, 1994; Banks et
al., 1997; Banks et al., 1999; Horwitz, 2005; CBO, 2006; David and Helmchen, 2006,
Vladeck 2006; Hseuh et al., 2009). Although there is clear evidence of regulation-driven
cross-subsidization of otherwise unprofitable services in the transportation and
telecommunications industries (Banks et al. 1999, Nicolas 1991; Chevalier, 2004),
evidence of cross-subsidization in the hospital industry remains largely anecdotal and its
extent is not well documented.

Hospital cross-subsidization is not transparent from an accounting perspective, and
therefore direct observation of this practice and its extent is not possible. Instead,
identification must rely on shocks affecting only profitable services, such that their effect
on unprofitable services can only be channeled through cross-subsidization.2

In this paper, we use single-specialty hospitals’ entry in the market for select procedures
as a shock that affects incumbent hospitals’ profits.3,4 Although single-specialty entrants

1

Other mechanisms include DSH payments, bailouts, uncompensated care pools, tax exemptions, and
donations. We examine each of these in the Discussion section.

2

Unprofitable care, also referred to as under- and uncompensated care, includes free or discounted care,
bad debt, as well as shortfalls from Medicare, Medicaid and other public programs. While U.S. hospitals
provide approximately $30 billion in unpaid care annually, the practice of financing unprofitable care is not
well understood (Nicholson et al., 2000; Vladeck 2006).
3

The federal law defines a specialty hospital as one that is “primarily engaged in the care and treatment of
cardiac, orthopedic, or surgical patients” (MedPAC 2005), omitting from this definition psychiatric, and
long-term acute hospitals that also are all single-specialty hospitals.

-4hospitals carefully consider their potential competitors’

provision of the contested

services before entry, they are unlikely to consider explicitly the incumbents’ provision
of uncontested and unprofitable services in particular (Burns, David and Helmchen,
2011). At the same time, unprofitable services offered by incumbent hospitals will be
affected if they rely financially on the profitable services contested by the entrant. In
short, we posit that entry into a specific set of profitable services directly affects
incumbents’ profits but does not affect their provision of unprofitable services except
through the shock to profits.

The theoretical foundation for this argument is presented in Faulhaber (1975), who
develops a model of pricing by regulated firms and shows that cross-subsidization in a
free market would lead to competitive entry and result in instability of the crosssubsidizing enterprise. This mechanism has not been investigated empirically in the
hospital industry. Moreover, although the possibility of entry by specialty hospitals can
challenge the financial resilience and mission-fulfillment capability of incumbent general
hospitals, it is not clear if and how general hospitals reconfigure the scope, quantity and
quality of their other, uncontested service lines in response to entry. Yet, the potential for
adverse effects on general hospitals’ ability to cross-subsidize unprofitable care led
Congress to institute a moratorium in November 2003 that halted the entry of new singlespecialty hospitals.5
4

Reports by the Medicare Payment Advisory Committee (MedPAC) and the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) found conflicting results on the effect of entry by specialty hospitals on community
hospitals’ revenues (MedPAC 2005, GAO 2003).

5

While the moratorium ended in August 2006, no specialty hospitals entered the markets we study after
this date.
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The conditions for cross-subsidization across different service lines persist, in part
because reimbursement for traditional Medicare and Medicaid admissions is based on
non-market prices set by the Federal and state governments, respectively. These price
distortions persist to the extent that service lines remain profitable or unprofitable for a
much longer period than in industries that face market prices.

As a result, cross-

subsidization would be possible in the hospital industry even if Medicare was the only
payer.

Variability in the generosity of prices across service lines also occurs in the

private market because prices will be a function of the ex-ante demand for services of
insurers' beneficiaries (Capps, Dranove and Satterthwaite, 2003). Insurers will pay a
premium to ensure broad access for services that treat diagnoses that are more common
and predictable in order to make their health plans more attractive to firms and their
employees.

Federal regulations also play a role in the persistence of profitable and unprofitable
service lines. The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA)
limits the ability of a hospital to discriminate among emergency patients based on ability
to pay. Under these rules, emergency patients must be stabilized before being discharged
from the hospital or the emergency room, regardless of payer. Thus service lines that
tend to attract a large number of underinsured emergency patients tend to be less
profitable, conditional upon a hospital's location. No such restrictions are placed on
elective or urgent care if the patient is otherwise stable and is not faced with imminent

-6death in the absence of treatment. Thus, service lines for treatment that can be scheduled
in advance lend themselves more easily for discrimination by insurers.

Although entry by single-specialty hospitals is plausibly exogenous to incumbents’
provision of uncontested unprofitable services, the location of a new entrant within a
market is not random. A potential entrant will consider the prospective demand for its
services in the context of the competitiveness of hospitals that supply contested services
proximate to its potential location.

There may be unmeasured factors that lead a

prospective entrant to choose one site over another. Unmeasured factors such as the
availability of a suitable site is likely to only be indirectly correlated with the provision of
uncontested services.

However, unmeasured factors, such as the efficiency of or

physician morale at incumbent hospitals in the immediate vicinity of the entrant may be
directly correlated with the provision of uncontested services.

We include an

instrumental-variables specification that addresses these potential endogeneity concerns.

We study the effect of entry by three specialty cardiac hospitals in Arizona on the
provision of psychiatric, trauma, and substance-abuse care by incumbent general
hospitals.6 These uncontested services are considered to be unprofitable (Horwitz, 2005;
Vladeck 2006; Hseuh et al., 2009). We also test the effect of entry on incumbents’
provision of neurosurgery, an uncontested but profitable service (Lindrooth et al. 2011).
The response by incumbent hospitals to a negative profitability shock allows us to study
the reliance of select uncontested services on cross-subsidization. We chose to study

6

Tucson Heart Hospital entered Tucson in 1998 and was fully operational in 1999, Arizona Heart Hospital
entered Phoenix in 2000; , and Banner Baywood Heart Hospital entered Mesa in 2003.

-7Arizona because entry occurred in two markets that are geographically well-delineated.
In addition, entry was limited to cardiac specialty hospitals over a relatively short period
of time, allowing us to use longer time series for the pre- and post-entry periods.
We find evidence supporting system-level cross-subsidization of services considered
unprofitable. In addition, we find evidence of hospital systems shifting into other services
considered profitable in response to entry. These responses increase with the degree to
which their contested services have been impacted.
The paper is organized as follows: section II discusses our strategy for identifying crosssubsidization. Section III presents the methodology used for measuring hospitals’
exposure to entry and its effect on provision of unprofitable services. Section IV
describes the data. The results are discussed in Section V. Section VI concludes.

II. Identifying the effect of entry on the provision of unprofitable services
Entry of specialty hospitals into profitable service lines has the potential of compromising
the ability of incumbent general community hospitals to cross-subsidize unprofitable
services (Schactman, 2005; Schneider et al., 2005; Berenson et al, 2006; Shneider et al.,
2007; Shneider et al., 2008; Tynan, 2009; Cassil, 2009; Al-Amin et al., 2010; Burns et
al., 2010; Steinbuch, 2010).

Most stand-alone specialty hospitals are for-profit entities

(Hadley and Zuckerman, 2005; Guterman, 2006)7 and many are at least partially owned

7

The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services define a specialty hospital as either: (1) a hospital where
more than two-thirds of Medicare inpatients fall into no more than two Major Diagnostic Categories, which
encompass a range of similar Diagnosis-Related Groups (DRGs), or (2) a hospital where two thirds or more
of Medicare claims are from surgical DRGs (McClellan, 2005). The Government Accountability Office
(GAO, 2003) identified nearly 100 stand-alone specialty hospitals in three major categories: cardiac (17
hospitals), orthopedic (36), surgical (22). Women’s hospitals and other types of specialty hospitals made up
the remainder.

-8by physicians (Cromwell et al., 2005; McClellan, 2005).8 They enter when they expect to
make a profit and aim to attract patients suited for standard, low risk procedures that will
maximize profitability, potentially leaving to incumbent hospitals disproportionately treat
many high-risk patients with complex care requirements.9 Indeed, specialty hospitals
have been found to be more profitable than general community hospitals when all payer
types are considered (GAO 2003; Iglehart, 2005), in part because specialty hospitals treat
a lower percentage of severely ill patients than community hospitals (GAO 2003;
MedPAC 2005; Barro et al. 2005; Mitchell 2005; Cromwell et al. 2005; Greenwald et al.
2006; Cram et al. 2005).
Entry of additional treatment providers in the market for contested services should be
welcomed by patients because greater competition will tend to lower prices, in the form
of a reduced time price of reaching the nearest provider of these services and potentially
even in the form of lower fees and health insurance premia. However, entry may
adversely affect the provision of uncontested services if it compromises incumbent
hospital systems’ ability to cross-subsidize less profitable or unprofitable services. For
instance, cardiology and cardiovascular surgery diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) account
for 25-40% of the average community hospital’s net revenue (Casalino et al., 2003);

8

Physician ownership of specialty hospitals poses a particular organizational and financial challenge for
general hospitals that compete in the same market. Physician-owners have a stake in the clinical and
financial performance of the hospital and are a major source of patient referrals. Cardiac specialty hospitals
in particular have a higher percentage of physician ownership on average than other types of specialty
hospitals.

9

Specialty hospitals tend to be concentrated in states that lack certificate-of-need (CON) laws; all specialty
hospitals are located in 28 states, with two-thirds located in just 7 states (GAO, 2003). In addition,
specialty hospitals tend to be located in high-growth metropolitan areas that lack a dominant community
hospital, and that have a large, single-specialty physician practice group (Casalino et al., 2003).

-9entry by an aggressive competitor will put this revenue, and thus the incumbent’s overall
financial viability, at risk.

Current studies of incumbent hospitals’ exposure to entry compare markets that
experienced entry to markets that did not.

A market-level measure does not take

advantage of the considerable within-market variation in the substitutability of the new
entrant's and the incumbent hospitals' contested service offerings.

Forward-looking

potential entrants evaluate very carefully and strategically their likely prospects of
success if they decide to start offering services in a given market and in a given location.
Entrants will enter markets based on their prospects of success and thus, the markets and
sites that new entrants select are not randomly chosen and may differ systematically from
markets that are not selected for entry. Moreover, some markets do not experience entry
because incumbent hospitals succeed in deterring entry, for instance by allocating more
resources to physicians attractive to single-specialty competitors (Burns, Walston et al.
2001; Burns, Alexander, et al. 2001; Dafny 2005; Dobson and Randall 2005; Berenson et
al., 2006; Burns, David and Helmchen 2011). In the latter case, entry by single-specialty
competitors will raise the bargaining power of physicians providing contested services, as
these groups may credibly threaten the incumbent hospitals with defecting to the entering
specialty facilities. As entry deterrence is likely to claim resources from incumbent
hospitals, a failure to distinguish between markets that are not entry targets and those that
are may mask the true effect of entry on the provision of uncontested services by
incumbent hospitals.

- 10 By contrast, we directly measure the degree to which an incumbent hospital's services are
substitutes for the entrant’s. This enables us to exploit within market variation in the
exposure to entry and thereby increase the efficiency of our estimates. Specifically,
exposure to entry at incumbent hospitals is measured using the estimated change in
medical and surgical discharges of contested services that is attributable to entry. This
measure of exposure takes into account the degree of service overlap and the physical
location of the incumbent hospital vis-à-vis the entrant. Ceteris paribus the more closely
prospective patients can substitute the contested service from the incumbent provider for
the entering competitor, the more exposed the incumbent is to the negative profitability
shock due to entry.

We calculate the degree of exposure using the predictions from a logit demand model of
a patient's choice of hospital. To this end, we calculated the predicted number of
admissions with entry and then performed a counter-factual simulation to predict the
number of admissions had entry not occurred. The difference between these two
predictions provides an estimate of the change in cardiac admissions that are due to entry.
We then sum the predicted change in admissions over all hospitals that are members of
the same hospital system and create a dummy variable that equals one if the system-level
change in admissions is greater than the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile of the predicted
change, respectively.10

10

This dummy variable equals one for hospitals that are not in a system if the hospital-level change in
admissions is greater than the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile of the predicted change among hospitals,
respectively.

- 11 As many hospitals are part of multi-hospital systems, the relevant economic unit for the
study of cross-subsidization is not obvious. There are good reasons to consider the system
as the appropriate unit of analysis (Bazzoli et al. 2000, Dubbs et al. 2004). After all,
financial viability is meaningful at the system level, as cross-subsidization can take place
across hospitals within a system, especially when systems take advantage of scale
economies by concentrating service lines in a subset of their hospitals. Similarly, the
geographic location of hospitals within a system may allow internal subsidies, with
hospitals in affluent suburban neighborhoods subsidizing underfunded inner-city
hospitals.

Hospital systems at the 25th percentile and above include hospitals that are the closest
substitutes to the new entrant and are therefore most exposed to specialty entry. The
substitutability with the entrant falls as we include hospitals in systems in the 50th and
75th percentile of exposure. We vary the cutoff for exposure as we do not know a priori
which level of exposure represents a large enough shock to profits to affect the provision
of uncontested services. We then model the provision of uncontested services as a
function of each exposure measure and other hospital and patient characteristics specific
to each uncontested service. We focus on three uncontested services that are commonly
thought to be unprofitable (psychiatric, trauma, and substance-abuse care) and on one
service thought to be profitable (neurosurgery).

We model the degree of impact based on the total number of admissions lost to the
entrant. This simplifies the analysis considerably and will not affect our results as long as

- 12 the affect of entry on a hospital or system's profits are a monotonic function of the
admissions lost. This is likely to be the case because a specialty hospital is unlikely to be
able to discriminate among patients based on the incumbent hospital the patients would
have been admitted to had it not entered.

In other words, our estimate of which

incumbent hospitals are most impacted by entry will be affected because the specialty
hospital will be just as likely to accept a desirable patient regardless of the patient's
second choice of hospital11. Similarly, an estimate of the effect of entry on the private
insurers price at incumbent hospitals will be proportional to the number of admissions
lost to the entrant.

As discussed above, entry by specialty hospitals is not random, as both the timing and
location of entry are contingent on current and expected future developments in the
market for the contested services, such as changes in reimbursement policies, patient
demographics, physician availability, and medical technology. The choice of market by
specialty providers should be uncorrelated with developments in the market for the
uncontested services.

However, within markets, it may be the case that a specialty entrant locates close to
incumbents that are most vulnerable to competition in order to maximize its future
prospect for success. For example, a site next to a poorly run incumbent hospital with
discontent cardiologists will be relatively attractive to a new cardiac specialty hospital

11

Physicians that admit to both a specialty hospital and an incumbent hospital would be able to observe the
insurer and be in a position to choose where a patient has a procedure. The only way such an arrangement
could affect our results is the unlikely case where the physician funneled unprofitable patients to the
specialty hospital.

- 13 because it would be cheaper and easier to attract the cardiologists, and their patients,
away from the incumbent hospital.12 To the extent that such bias exists, its direction is
not clear. If the discontent of physicians with the incumbent hospital is not limited to
cardiologists then physicians in uncontested specialties will also be more likely to leave
the incumbent hospital. In this case failure to address the endogeneity of the choice of
entry site would bias the results in favor of cross-subsidization. On the other hand, it may
be that adjacent incumbent hospitals are poorly run and thus particularly vulnerable to
competition.

A hospital may be inefficient to the extent that it does not have the

management or systems in place to cross-subsidize, which would bias the results towards
the null hypothesis of no cross-subsidization.

Hospital fixed effects control for time invariant factors potentially related to the entry
decision and the market for uncontested services.

However, time-varying hospital-

specific factors could potentially bias our results. We include an IV specification to
address this possible source of bias.

We chose instruments that measure the cross-

sectional pre-entry susceptibility of a hospital to entry and the attractiveness of each
hospital's catchment area to a potential specialty entrant. The instruments are described
in more detail below.

III. Methods
Uncontested services at hospitals with substantial service overlap with or in close
geographic proximity to new entrants will be most exposed to entry. Thus a difference-

12

This example is based on informal communication with general and specialty hospital executives in the
Phoenix, AZ market.

- 14 in-differences approach using a market-level indicator of entry will capture the net effect
of entry but will not differentiate between decreases in uncontested services at exposed
hospitals and increases in uncontested services at hospitals that are not exposed.

We begin by describing our method for estimating each hospital system’s exposure to
entry through its impact on contested services and then estimate how the effect of entry
on the provision of uncontested services varies by exposure.
Exposure is calculated using estimates of the effect of specialty hospital entry on the
incumbent hospitals’ admissions of patients for the contested service. First, the effect of
entry on admissions at the incumbent hospital is estimated using the parameters of a logit
demand model of hospital choice. To ease computational burden, we estimate a grouped
conditional logit model in which the data are aggregated to the zip code – diagnosis pair
level (Guimarães, Figueirdo, and Woodward, 2003). Next, using the parameter estimates,
we estimate the expected number of cardiac admissions in each year over the entire
sample period at the system and hospital levels, denoted E(Admissionsstentry) and
E(Admissionshtentry), respectively. The expected number of cardiac admissions at each
hospital system if the specialty hospital had not entered the market is denoted
E(Admissionsstno

entry

) and E(Admissionshtno

entry

), respectively. The estimates without

entry are derived by eliminating the specialty hospital as an option and re-normalizing the
predicted probabilities so that they sum to one. We use the same parameter estimates to
calculate the number of admissions with and without entry.

For each system and

hospital, the change in admissions resulting from entry at system s and hospital h is then
calculated as:
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(1) Admissionsst  Admissionsstentry  Admissionsstno entry

Admissionsht  Admissionshtentry  Admissionshtno entry

For the hospital that entered, E(Admissions No Entry) will equal zero.
We assume that an incumbent hospital will respond to entry only when

Admissions.t is large enough to warrant the fixed costs of changing service offerings.
We set Exposure.t equal to one if Admissions.t is greater than a response threshold,

Admissions..Threshhold , and zero otherwise:

Exposure.t  1 if Admissions.t  Admissions..Threshhold
Exposure.t  0 , otherwise
Our measure of exposure relies on the well-known independence of irrelevant
alternatives (IIA) assumption that underlies multinomial logit demand models. In our
context, this assumption maintains that the existence of a specialty hospital does not
affect the desirability of one incumbent hospital versus another (i.e. the relative
probability of visiting any two incumbent hospitals is unchanged, regardless of whether
there was entry by a specialty hospital). Thus the addition of a specialty hospital will
leave unchanged patients’ relative probabilities of choosing incumbent hospitals.13

13

This assumption is reasonable in our specification because, as is described below, we stratified the
sample by diagnosis and estimated the model for medical and for surgical admissions separately.
Furthermore, within these diagnosis and procedure categories we interacted the clinical supply
characteristics of each hospital with the clinical diagnosis characteristics of each patient and also control for
travel time from the patient's zip code to each hospital in the choice set. Patients reach each diagnosis
node, not by choice, but by nature of their illness. Clearly if specialty hospitals induce demand for more
intensive services then our specification that limits the IIA assumption to within diagnosis cells would lead
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Changes in the total number of admissions due to entry will affect both

Admissions..Threshhold and Admissionsht leaving Exposureht unchanged. For hospitals in
systems Admissions..Threshhold is based on the system-level exposure whereas the exposure
of independent hospitals is measured using a threshold based on hospital-level exposure.

Entry may also affect the prices that hospitals charge private payers for the contested
service. While we don't observe these prices, the effect of entry on prices could be
approximated by calculating the value of a given hospital to an insurance network with
and without entry (Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite 2003). The resulting change in
value would be proportional to the change in price within the market. However, as this
measure will be correlated with Admissionsht , we would be unlikely to identify separate
price and quantity effects in the analysis of the provision of uncontested services. Thus,
we make the simplifying assumption that the effect of entry on private prices is
proportional to the change in the number of patients.

We estimate the grouped conditional logit model separately for each market and
separately for patients with medical and surgical cardiac diagnoses. Medical admissions
occur at more hospitals than surgical admissions reflecting the complexity of cardiac
surgery. In addition, admissions at specialty hospitals consist of a higher proportion of
surgical admissions than at general hospitals.

to higher estimates of exposure. However, it would not affect our analysis of uncontested services because
the system ranking of exposure would be unchanged.

- 17 To investigate the effect of using a market-level versus system-level measure of
exposure, we estimate a generalized negative binomial regression of the number of
admissions for each uncontested service with hospital fixed effects.14 The resulting
parameter estimates are identified using difference-in-differences and we use robust
standard errors with hospital level clustering (Bertrand, et al., 2004). The estimates with
the market-level measure of entry reflect the net effect of entry and identification requires
the use of a comparison state to control for contemporaneous trends.

We also measure the effect of exposure to entry on hospital market share, or equivalently,
the probability a patient is admitted to an exposed hospital versus other hospitals in the
patient's choice set. Exposed hospitals can reduce the supply of unprofitable uncontested
services by reducing the number of beds available for the services, shutting down
dedicated units that target uncontested services, or limiting admitting privileges of
physicians in uncontested specialties. Closing beds reflects an additional cost for a
patient admitted to an exposed hospital because his or her admission may be delayed due
to capacity constraints.

The closure of a dedicated unit will also decrease the

attractiveness of a hospital relative to its competitors and thus reduce the utility and
likelihood of an admission at the exposed hospital. An additional mechanism lies in
patients’ idiosyncratic valuation of a hospital. As is common in hospital choice models,
we assume that the attractiveness of individual physicians to the patient is encompassed
in his valuation of a hospital's idiosyncratic attributes because a patient's choice of a
14

The hospital fixed effect are included directly in the model rather than integrated out of the likelihood
function so as to mimic the difference in difference specification. Specification tests revealed that the data
exhibited over-dispersion and that the degree of over-dispersion was a function of the market and a fixed
indicator of whether the hospital was ever exposed to entry. Therefore we use a generalized version of the
negative binomial regression and explicitly model the degree of over-dispersion.

- 18 physician occurs in tandem with his choice of a hospital. Thus if exposed hospitals
reduce the supply of uncontested services by limiting the privileges of specialists of the
service then the expected utility of an admission to an exposed hospital will also be
lowered relative to its competitors.

This analysis enables us to estimate the degree of substitution that occurs between
hospitals that are exposed and those that are not exposed. We model the probability of an
admission for an uncontested service using a logit demand framework. The utility of
patient i admitted to hospital h in time t for a diagnosis related to an uncontested service
is:
(2) U hit Exposureht ,  h , X i , Thi   1 Exposureht   1Thi   2Thi  X i   3Thi   h   i   hit

where Exposureht is a dichotomous variable that measures whether incumbent hospital h
is exposed to entry at time t; Thi is the approximate travel time from patient i’s
residence’s zip code to hospital h. Xi is a column vector reflecting the patient
characteristics and clinical attributes that affect demand for inpatient services;  h is a
hospital fixed effect and θi. The final term in (2), εhit, represents the personal and
idiosyncratic component of patient i’s utility of admission to hospital h at time t.

Under the logit demand assumption, the predicted probability of a patient with
characteristics
at time t, is

 Xi ,Thi  of choosing a given hospital h from a set of G hospitals available

- 19 -

(3)

sht Gt , X i , Thi  

expU Exposureht ,  h , X i , i , Thi 
.
 exp U Exposuregt ,  g , X i , i , Tgi 





gGt

The parameter associated with Exposureht measures the effect of entry in contested
services on the probability a patient will be admitted to hospital h for an uncontested
service. Exposureht equals one if the hospital is exposed to entry and zero otherwise. We
use a discrete measure of exposure because the decision to change the supply of
uncontested services would only occur if the shock to a system's profitability was
sufficiently large.

The specifications in Equations 2 and 3 are intentionally parsimonious. Hospital fixed
effects control for service offerings that are fixed over the entire time period. We do not
control for specialty service offerings that vary over time because hospital administrators
may add or drop these services in response to entry and the inclusion of these changes
over time would yield inconsistent estimates of the exposure. As a result our estimates
capture all changes in specialty services offerings at more exposed hospitals relative to
less exposed ones.

We estimate Equation 3 using a conditional logit model. We calculate robust standard
errors with hospital-level clustering. Our specification is analogous to a difference-indifferences approach where the sample consists of admissions pre- and post- entry, the
treatment is exposure to entry, and the outcome is the probability of an admission. The
control group consists of hospitals located in Colorado or those located in Phoenix or
Tucson but not exposed to entry.

- 20 -

As discussed above, when a cardiac hospital enters a market it will likely scout out
potential sites and choose a site that best suits its objective. The potential entrant will
therefore choose a location that is attractive to both cardiologists and their patients. In
this case, the estimated effect of entry on a hospital's admissions will be correlated with
unobserved hospital characteristics such as quality or managerial approach. If these
characteristics are also correlated with the provision of uncontested services then the
exposure of a hospital to entry may be correlated with the supply of uncontested services,
thus making Exposureht potentially endogenous.

We control for endogeneity using the two-stage method of residual inclusion because the
main equation is nonlinear (Basu and Terza 2009). We chose two sets of instruments that
(1) measure demand characteristics that affect the appeal of a hospital's catchment area
for a specialty hospital and (2) measure the susceptibility of incumbent hospitals’ profits
to entry. We posit that the instruments we selected predict the exposure of an incumbent
hospital to entry while at the same time are uncorrelated with unmeasured factors that
would lead to both increased exposure and a deterioration of uncontested service demand.
The first set of instruments measures the expected demand for cardiac services in each
incumbent hospital's catchment area. Hospitals in market areas where there is a high
demand for cardiac services and that draw patients from wealthier zip codes are more
likely to face increased competition due to entry than other market areas, ceterus paribus.
Conditional on hospital fixed effects, these instruments are unlikely to directly affect
uncontested services.

- 21 The first set of instruments measure the total number of admissions in a hospitals
catchment area that require cardiac catheterization, open heart surgery, or stent
placements:
Z

(4) Catchment Area Admissions htd  
z 1

Zip Code Admissions ztd
DriveTime z , h

where the superscript d indicates cardiac catheterization, open heart surgery, or stent
placements; Zip Code Admissions is the number of admissions of residents in zip code z
that require procedure d; and Drive Time is amount of time it takes to drive from zip code
z to hospital h. We also calculated a measure of the hospital catchment area income
using Equation 4 by replacing Zip Code Admissions with zip code per capita income.
Equation 4 assigns greater weight to admissions and income at zip codes that are more
proximate to a hospital. Large values reflect hospital catchment areas that are proximate
to zip codes with a large number of patients with a given diagnosis or a higher income
population. A hospital on the fringe of a metro area might have relatively low values for
the diagnosis measures because the drive time to the hospital from the population center
is relatively long. However, such a hospital may have a larger value on the income
measure if the fringe of the metro area had higher average income than the population
centers.

To measure the supply of cardiac services at each incumbent hospital taking into account
system membership, the second set of instruments measure the number of open heart
surgery units and cardiac catheter laboratories operated by a system or an independent
hospital at the beginning of our sample period (1997). These variables measure the
baseline susceptibility of the system's profits to competition in cardiac services. We fix
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drop services in response to entry and a contemporaneous measure of supply would be
endogenous in the first-stage equation. Second, a potential entrant will choose among
sites based on the expected supply of services at the time of entry. Finally, we measure
supply at the system level because even if a hospital that is proximate to a potential site
does not offer a service locally, specialist physicians commonly have offices at multiple
sites but will perform more complicated surgeries at a particular branch within a system.
Patients are typically willing to travel further for surgery than for less complicated care.

VI. Data
Our primary dataset is the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project State Inpatient
Database (SID), which consists of the inpatient discharge abstracts from all hospitals in
Arizona and Colorado of all patients discharged between 1997-1998 and 2005-2007.
The sample includes admissions to all non-federal general or cardiac specialty hospitals
in the Phoenix, Tucson, and Colorado’s front range (including Boulder, Colorado
Springs, and Denver) markets for contested and uncontested services. Colorado borders
Arizona to the northeast, and the front range of Colorado is similar to Phoenix and
Tucson in a number of ways. Both states have major population centers that are well
delineated from surrounding areas. The front range of Colorado is bordered by the
Rocky Mountains to the west and semi-arid grasslands to the east. Similarly, Phoenix
and Tucson are surrounded by Sonoran Desert to the south and west and mountains to the
north. These markets have a comparable prevalence of large local and national systems,
reflecting a similar hospital regulatory environments. In addition, and perhaps most
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was no specialty cardiac hospital entry in Colorado during the time period of our sample.

We limited the sample to a pre-period 1997-1998 and a three-year post-period 2005-2007
in order to capture the long-run effects of the shock. We expect there to be a lag between
entry and the effect on hospital's profits. Furthermore, there is likely to be a lag between
reduced profitability and decisions regarding service offerings. Tucson Heart Hospital
opened Tucson in 1998 and Arizona Heart Hospital opened in Phoenix in 1999. Both
experienced rapid growth in 1999-2000 but the growth leveled off after 2000. Banner
Baywood Heart Hospital entered Mesa in 2001 and after two years of rapid growth its
admissions stabilized after 2003.

Furthermore, likely in response to entry, the

composition of systems changed between 2000-2003 as hospitals realigned services to
adapt to the new market structure.

Admissions to a contested service are defined as an admission in the Circulatory System
Major Diagnostic Category (MDC 5). We examine the following uncontested services:
Psychiatry (MDC 19); Alcohol and Drug Treatment (MDC 20); and Trauma (MDC 24),
all commonly considered to be unprofitable services (Horwitz, 2005; Vladeck 2006;
Hseuh et al., 2009). We also estimate the model using a sample of neurosurgery
discharges. In contrast to psychiatric, substance abuse, and trauma services, neurosurgery
is thought to be a profitable service (Lindrooth et al. 2011). As neither market in Arizona

- 24 experienced entry into neurosurgery, we predict those incumbents most exposed to entry
to raise, rather than reduce, the number of neurosurgery discharges.15

We restrict the sample to persons who were treated within their state of residence.
Emergency admissions are identified using the admission type associated with the
discharge. We do not distinguish between admissions from each payer because several
hospitals did not consistently report payer type in the HCUP-SID data. However, the
majority of admissions for cardiac care are either Medicare or private. Medicaid and
self-pay admissions for cardiac care are relatively rare. We include a dummy variable
that indicates if the payer was an HMO to control for the fact that HMOs use selective
contracting which could result in idiosyncratic differences in travel patterns for these
patients.

Travel times from the epicenter of each patient zip code to the address of the closest
hospital-based service are calculated using data from Mapquest, Inc (Mapquest 2010). In
the psychiatry sample we include the drive time to closest private specialty psychiatric
hospital as a covariate to control for secular variation in access to substitutes to general
hospital psychiatric admissions because the HCUP does not include discharges from
specialty psychiatric hospitals.

15

This prediction relies on the assumption that hospitals chose their pre-entry mix of profitable services
optimally and were operating at capacity. If entry by specialty cardiac hospitals reduced cardiac
admissions, space and time would be freed up to provide other services that require similar facilities and
personnel.

- 25 We link the SID files to data from the American Hospital Association Annual Survey of
Hospitals (AHA) to incorporate additional hospital covariates and merge in zip code level
median income from the U.S. Census Bureau Population Estimates. System membership;
the existence of a cardiac catheterization lab; and open heart surgery capability are also
drawn from the AHA data. The hospital covariates included in each specification are
listed in Table 1.

V. Results
Table 2 shows the net income from patients and the number of admissions for hospitals in
Arizona by the estimated degree of exposure. The 25th percentile of exposure reflects
hospitals in systems that experienced an estimated reduction of more than 786 admissions
or for independent hospital a reduction of more than 416 hospital admissions. The
threshold for the 50th percentile is 665 system-level or 210 hospital-level admissions and
the threshold for the 75th percentile is 263 system-level or 87 hospital-level admissions
for system and independent hospitals respectively. Overall, aggregate service offerings
were unrelated to exposure. However, hospitals without an impact were much more
profitable in the post period than in the pre period.

Trends in admissions for uncontested services are shown in Table 3 which includes the
parameter estimates of an ordinary least squares regression of admissions on exposure
and year and hospital fixed effects.

The constant reflects the average number of

admissions for each service line in 1997. Psychiatric admissions declined at exposed
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degree of exposure. Trauma admissions were not significantly affected. Admissions for
substance abuse declined by 38-60 admissions at exposed hospitals or 60-100%.
Admissions for neurology increased at exposed hospitals but the coefficient is not
statistically significant. Overall, admissions increased from 1997-2007, though they
dipped in 2006 relative to 2007.

Table 4 shows the results of a negative binomial regression of the number admissions
using a state-level measure of exposure pre and post entry. The coefficient estimates
reveal a growth in the Arizona and Colorado markets of the number of psychiatric;
trauma, and substance abuse admissions. The increase was smaller in Arizona but the
coefficient is not statistically significant.

Table 5 shows the marginal effects based on the coefficient estimates from a generalized
negative binomial count data model of the number of admissions at the system level. The
estimates reflect the change in admissions related to exposure for three uncontested
services: inpatient psychiatric services, trauma care, drug/substance abuse treatment. For
each service we report coefficient estimates for three samples: systems above the top 25th
percentile of exposure, systems above the top 50th percentile of exposure, and systems
above the top 75th percentile of exposure. For each sample-service pair we report results
with and without accounting for endogeneity.

- 27 The Shea partial R-squared from a linear probability model of the first stage ranges from
0.168 and 0.452. The Shea partial R-squared values for the hospital-level analysis are
quite similar to those for the patient-level analysis. The F-test statistics at the hospital
level range from 2.42 to 13.48 in the first stage of the negative binomial regression.
However, the F-test statistics are very large in the patient-level first stage used in the
conditional logit specification.

Overall, the instruments are strong predictors of

Exposureht in the patient-level analysis.

For inpatient psychiatric services, hospitals more exposed systems had fewer yearly
admissions post entry. The magnitude of the decrease ranges between 63.14 and 87.49
fewer psychiatric admissions, depending on the percentile of exposure and specification.
When accounting for endogeneity, the decrease in the number of yearly psychiatric
admissions is similar (between 66.6 and 84.03). Similar results are obtained for trauma
care and substance abuse treatment, although the results are often not statistically
significant.

Table 6 shows the coefficient estimates from the conditional logit model of the
probability of admissions to a given hospital. The estimates reflect the change in the
probability/market share of the hospital that is related to exposure for the three
uncontested services. Among the 25% most exposed hospitals the market share of
admissions for psychiatric services declined by 17.6 percentage points. The results are
consistent with those presented in Table 3, and the reported estimates are statistically
significant for all uncontested services. The likelihood of receiving care (for any of the
three contested services) in hospitals that are part of exposed systems was significantly
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the estimates from regressions adjusting for endogeneity, which are generally smaller
than the unadjusted ones. As the definition of exposure was more inclusive, the estimates
became smaller in magnitude. At the 75th percentile the estimate for psychiatric services
was small and statistically insignificant and the estimate for trauma services turned
positive.

Table 7 shows the results for admissions for neurosurgery. The first set of results are the
marginal effects from the hospital-level negative binomial regression model (analogous
to Table 5) and the second set of results are the change in market shares from the
conditional logit model (analogous to Table 6). We find that hospitals exposed to entry
in the top 25th percentile decreased their neurosurgery admissions though this result is
marginally significant. The decrease is smaller and the standard errors are larger when
the 50th and 75th-percentile cutoffs are used. This result is inconsistent with the trends in
the linear fixed effect regression and the conditional logit analysis, where the probability
of admission at hospitals above the top 25th , 50th and 75th percentile of exposure
increased by 0.10 to about 0.20.

By shifting to other highly reimbursed services,

hospitals allocate resources away from contested services to partially offset the loss of
patient revenue. This strategy would mitigate the effect on cross-subsidization, but is
unlikely to fully offset the loss of revenue caused by specialty entry. If it did, that would
indicate that hospitals were not allocating resources efficiently in the pre-entry period.
This results suggests that systems do adjust their service offering of uncontested services
(both profitable and unprofitable), and that the results in tables 3 and 4 represent the
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hospital systems.

VI. Discussion
This is the first study to present systematic evidence of cross-subsidization of
unprofitable service lines by using a shock to a profitable service line. We show that
hospital systems adjusted their uncontested service offerings in the face of entry by
single-specialty competitors. Consistent with cross-subsidization, reductions in the
volume of psychiatric, substance abuse, and trauma care were greater among hospital
systems most exposed to a potential loss in volume of their cardiac services.

We also find that the market share of neurosurgeries increased at exposed hospitals.
though we do not find evidence that the total number of surgeries increased. These
systems may have siphoned off neurosurgery admissions from less exposed systems or
adjacent geographic regions. Alternatively, they may have succeeded in encouraging
marginal patients who would have delayed or refused surgery otherwise to undergo the
procedure. This suggests that systems unable to replace lost revenue from cardiac care
with new revenue from neurosurgery volume may come under even greater pressure to
reduce unprofitable services.

We focused on cross-subsidization across service lines, but there are several other
mechanisms to support the provision of unprofitable care, regardless of a patients
diagnosis. Governments provide special funding to hospitals treating a disproportionate
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Hospital (DSH) programs at the federal level and direct transfers at the state and local
level (Duggan, 2000). An increasingly popular approach used in several states is to
cross-subsidize unprofitable care across hospital systems using uncompensated care pools
(Anderson et al., 2009; Bovbjerg et al., 2000). The transfers related to DSH payments and
uncompensated care pools lessen the cost of cross subsidizing unprofitable services lines
but we find that indirect subsidies alone are not sufficient to eliminate it. As specialty
hospitals aim to treat well-insured patients, they are unlikely to affect either the DSH
payments received by incumbent hospitals or the size of the uncompensated care pool.

Furthermore, it is not uncommon for communities to bail out hospitals that are considered
to provide community benefits in order to prevent bankruptcy and closure (Capps, et al.,
2010). Such subsidies are more likely if a hospital provides unprofitable services that are
in short supply. Sole providers of unprofitable services in a community may be in a
position to extract a subsidy from local governments in order to keep a service line
open.16

There is an extensive literature on cross-subsidization in the context of privately owned
regulated firms (Faulhaber, 1975; Peltzman, 1976; Nicolas 1991; Chevalier, 2004).
Regulation of the transportation and telecommunications industries has broadly consisted
of requirements for providing some services below average cost while using entry

16

Similarly, nonprofit hospitals receive tax exemptions and can use the retained tax payments for this
purpose, and a number of states have introduced explicit charity care mandates (Ginn and Moseley 2006;
Nobel et al., 1998). Additionally, nonprofit hospitals may rely on unrelated business activity (Riley, 2007)
and donations (Okten and Weisbrod, 2000; Leone and Van-Horn, 2005) to finance uncompensated care.
While incumbent hospitals might react to entry by declaring bankruptcy or switching their ownership type.
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creation of Amtrak in 1971) cross-subsidized unprofitable passenger services with profits
from freight (Banks et al., 1999). In telecommunications, profits from long-distance
services were used to subsidize local services (Nicolas, 1991). Over-time these
regulations produced inefficient outcomes that eventually led to the deregulation of these
industries (Peltzman, 1989; Banks et al., 1999).
Evidence of cross-subsidization by general hospitals does not mean, however, that this is
an efficient way to achieve social goals such as supporting access to services or serving
indigent patients (David and Helmchen 2006, Capps et al., 2010, Capps et al., 2011;
Lindrooth et al., 2003). It may be advisable to preserve activities deemed socially vital,
as opposed to preserving the mechanisms set forth to finance such activities.

Our

findings corroborate the conjecture that hospitals adjust downward their offerings of
arguably unprofitable services in response to an adverse shock to services considered to
be profitable enough to encourage entry by single-specialty hospitals. In light of these
findings, a comprehensive welfare analysis of entry by single-specialty hospitals should
include not only its market-wide effects on contested services but also consider its
market-wide effects on uncontested services which rely on general hospitals’ crosssubsidization efforts.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics
Sample:
Emergency Admission
HMO Primary Payer
Age 50-74
Age >74
Ln(Drive Time)
# Procedures
# Diagnoses
Ln(Drive Time) interacted with:
Age 50-74

Psychiatric
Trauma
Patient Characteristics
39.50%
67.30%
17.7%
22.5%
22.10%
28.60%
12.70%
11.50%
2.652
2.644
(0.751)
(0.885)
0.269
1.561
(0.724)
(1.981)
4.971
6.127
(2.327)
(2.099)

Substance Abuse

Neurosurgery

58.70%
20.9%
28.60%
4.68%
3.391
(0.767)
0.659
(0.860)
5.718
(2.108)

22.60%
31.8%
48.20%
24.80%
3.378
(0.738)
2.592
(1.665)
5.420
(2.383)

0.588
0.773
0.973
(1.165)
(1.310)
(1.591)
Age >74
0.326
0.286
0.163
(0.899)
(0.853)
(0.753)
HMO Primary Payer
0.476
0.591
0.713
(1.076)
(1.164)
(1.428)
# Procedures
0.702
4.396
2.210
(2.027)
(6.196)
(2.974)
# Diagnoses
13.11
16.16
19.30
(7.317)
(7.972)
(8.346)
Admissions
51,803
48,652
16,897
Hospital Characteristics (Weighted by Hospital Admissions)
Phoenix
49.50%
59.00%
53.80%
Tucson
17.90%
18.00%
17.30%
System Exposure Top Quartile
7.14%
10.90%
6.94%
System Exposure Median
14.80%
20.90%
15.00%
System Exposure Top 3
Quartiles
23.50%
29.30%
26.00%
Partial Year Data
0.42%
0.58%
For-profit
24.00%
33.10%
20.80%
Teaching
12.80%
10.50%
14.50%
Psychiatric
Substance Abuse
Unit
Trauma Unit
Unit
Specialty Service Offerings:
Hospital
66.80%
64.40%
23.10%
Specialty Service Offerings:
System
44.40%
53.60%
22.50%
Hospital Years
196
239
173

1.639
(1.773)
0.838
(1.506)
1.070
(1.600)
8.740
(6.074)
18.29
(9.122)
25,113
60.10%
16.00%
10.60%
20.20%
31.90%
0.53%
32.40%
13.30%

N/A
N/A
188

Table 2. Net Income from Patients and Admissions for Arizona Hospital Systems Before and After Entry, by Exposure
No Exposure
Top 25th Percentile
Top 50th Percentile
Top 75th Percentile
Pre
Post
Pre
Post
Pre
Post
Pre
Post
Net Income from Patients
$768,151 $3,110,139
$312,606
-$680,824 -$576,530 -$329,053 -$759,803
-$477,308
(Median)
Psychiatric Admissions

114.23
(109.44)

157.08
(174.59)

65.00
(38.12)

73.07
(69.55)

114.46
(107.77)

115.95
(138.58)

99.68
(97.70)

127.07
(143.60)

Trauma Admissions

111.75
(120.40)

170.78
(186.34)

152.65
(122.03)

178.30
(165.28)

165.19
(129.86)

188.50
(173.41)

152.54
(122.54)

190.61
(162.77)

Substance Abuse Admissions

53.53
(46.33)

96.26
(92.90)

68.13
(91.89)

46.63
(22.07)

72.88
(78.83)

63.56
(48.68)

57.97
(68.76)

63.00
(45.80)

Neurosurgery Admissions

104.60
(61.36)

111.56
(72.35)

126.42
(155.40)

151.42
(278.39)

123.34
(134.78)

143.17
(241.60)

117.57
(122.43)

144.81
(213.47)

Standard deviation in parentheses

Table 3. Fixed Effect Analysis of Number of Admissions, by diagnosis
Psychiatric
Trauma
Substance Abuse

Neurosurgery

Top 25th percent of exposure (Reduction of more than 786 system-level or 416 hospital admissions)
Exposure
-39.29*
-15.00
-59.46***
(22.70)
(13.05)
(14.40)
1998
7.889
0.766
6.176
(14.45)
(8.931)
(9.458)
2005
64.01***
62.33***
48.61***
(15.80)
(9.716)
(10.00)
2006
59.82***
65.98***
46.38***
(15.95)
(9.775)
(10.00)
2007
30.11*
36.57***
28.15***
(15.95)
(9.919)
(10.10)
Constant
101.7***
131.9***
52.04***
(10.39)
(6.387)
(6.701)

10.86
(16.13)
6.405
(11.58)
30.76**
(12.83)
26.64**
(12.97)
-5.363
(12.97)
109.7***
(8.231)

Top 50th percent of exposure (Reduction of more than 665 system-level or 210 hospital admissions)
Exposure
-50.66**
-7.437
-51.80***
4.372
(19.96)
(11.85)
(12.67)
(14.98)
1998
8.007
0.766
6.176
6.405
(14.29)
(8.953)
(9.469)
(11.60)
2005
72.11***
60.79***
52.84***
32.44**
(16.21)
(10.02)
(10.42)
(13.43)
2006
65.40***
64.11***
47.66***
28.59**
(15.95)
(9.878)
(10.14)
(13.19)
2007
35.69**
34.82***
29.42***
-3.407
(15.95)
(10.13)
(10.23)
(13.19)
Constant
101.6***
132.0***
52.00***
109.6***
(10.27)
(6.405)
(6.708)
(8.242)
Top 75th percent of exposure (Reduction of more than 263 system-level or 87 hospital admissions)
Exposure
-18.47
1.894
-38.70***
18.04
(19.04)
(11.45)
(12.10)
(14.85)
1998
7.871
0.766
6.176
6.405
(14.55)
(8.962)
(9.682)
(11.54)
2005
63.90***
56.98***
55.07***
23.37
(17.77)
(10.85)
(11.56)
(14.72)
2006
58.41***
60.67***
50.63***
20.45
(17.28)
(10.59)
(11.20)
(14.26)
2007
28.70*
31.10***
32.44***
-11.55
(17.28)
(10.88)
(11.31)
(14.26)
Constant
101.7***
131.8***
51.96***
109.8***
Hospital-Years
196
239
172
183
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Control for Hospital Fixed Effects; Sample 1997-1998 & 2005-2007

Table 4. Negative Binomial Regression Estimates of the Market-Level Effect of Entry on Admissions, by
Diagnosis
Psychiatric
Trauma
Post-Entry
0.742***
0.315***
(0.214)
(0.0794)
Arizona*Post-Entry
-0.386
-0.00218
(0.260)
(0.0968)
Constant
6.366***
5.461***
(0.240)
(0.0922)
Observations
196
239
Robust standard errors with hospital level clustering in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Control for Hospital Fixed Effects; Sample 1997-1998 & 2005-2007

Substance Abuse
0.683***
(0.215)
-0.217
(0.260)
5.492***
(0.298)
172

Neurosurgery
0.123
(0.119)
-0.0711
(0.159)
5.105***
(0.136)
183

Table 5. Marginal Effects of Negative Binomial Regression of Number of Admissions, by Exposure
and Diagnosis
Psychiatric Services
Trauma Care
Substance Abuse
Variables
Endogenous
Endogenous
Endogenous
Top 25th percent of exposure (Reduction of more than 786 system-level or 416 hospital admissions)
-43.72*
-38.24
-13.92
-1.380
-24.31
-24.70
(25.08)
(24.85)
(8.700)
(9.010)
(19.18)
(19.95)
Top 50th percent of exposure (Reduction of more than 665 system-level or 210 hospital admissions)
-111.2***
-102.5***
-32.08**
-18.35
-44.04**
-39.03*
(36.67)
(35.98)
(14.41)
(12.01)
(21.97)
(23.48)
Top 75th percent of exposure (Reduction of more than 263 system-level or 87 hospital admissions)
-91.59***
-98.30***
-12.83
4.457
-32.27*
-27.05
(31.29)
(33.51)
(13.68)
(11.93)
(18.19)
(17.02)
Controls for Hospital Fixed Effects, Year, % Emergency Admissions and other hospital characteristics.
Robust standard errors with hospital clustering in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 6. Effect of Entry on Market Share, by Exposure Level and Diagnosis
Psychiatric Services
Trauma Care
Drug / Substance Abuse
Exposure to Entry
Endogenous
Endogenous
Endogenous
-0.180***
-0.176***
-0.157***
-0.110***
-1.277***
-1.291***
Top 25th percentile
(0.0351)
(0.0357)
(0.0250)
(0.0270)
(0.0519)
(0.0530)
Residual
0.0281
0.220***
-0.282
(0.0563)
(0.0525)
(0.197)
-0.337***
-0.343***
-0.117***
-0.0454*
-0.938***
-0.905***
Top 50th percentile
(0.0241)
(0.0260)
(0.0233)
(0.0252)
(0.0439)
(0.0441)
Residual
-0.0311
0.355***
0.648***
(0.0591)
(0.0552)
(0.129)
-0.244***
-0.0273
-0.0377
0.310***
-0.682***
-0.631***
Top 75th percentile
(0.0231)
(0.0318)
(0.0245)
(0.0342)
(0.0424)
(0.0423)
Residual
0.969***
1.154***
1.270***
(0.0970)
(0.0813)
(0.159)
Controls for Drive Time interacted with: Hospital Fixed Effects and Patient characteristics in Table 1; Year,
and whether the hospital reported partial year of data.
Robust standard errors with patient clustering are in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 7. Analysis of Neurosurgery Admissions
Number of Admissions
(Marginal Effects from Negative
Binomial)

Probability of Admission
(Market Share from Conditional Logit Model)

Endogenous
Endogenous
-40.98**
0.123***
0.112***
(18.47)
(0.0333)
(0.0335)
Top 50th percentile of exposure
Number of Admissions
Probability of Admission

Top 25th
percentile

-43.36**
(20.87)

Top 50th
percentile

-40.26**
(17.82)

Endogenous
Endogenous
-40.16***
0.0963***
0.133***
(15.35)
(0.0305)
(0.0315)
Top 75th percentile of exposure
Number of Admissions
Probability of Admission

Endogenous
-10.92
-24.56
0.226***
Top 75th
percentile
(18.40)
(22.20)
(0.0351)
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
NOTE: there are no hospital systems in Tuscon are in the top 25% of exposure

Endogenous
0.228***
(0.0352)

Table A1. Results of Conditional Logit Analysis Cardiac Admissions
Market:
Phoenix
Service:
Surgical
Medical
Teaching Hospital
Cardiac Catheterization
Open-heart Surgery
Ln(Drive Time)
Ln(Drive Time) interacted with:
Emergency Admission
Median Income
Age 50-74
Age >=75
# Procedures
# Diagnoses
HMO Payer

Tucson

Denver

Surgical

Medical

Surgical

Medical

0.483***
(0.0334)
0.488***
(0.0367)
0.839***
(0.0250)
-1.063***
(0.0331)

1.101***
(0.0293)
-0.483***
(0.0216)
0.823***
(0.0170)
-1.500***
(0.0231)

-1.298***
(0.0548)
0.468*
(0.263)
1.097***
(0.0940)
-0.0256
(0.0788)

-1.038***
(0.0447)
0.118**
(0.0574)
1.080***
(0.0503)
-0.504***
(0.0441)

0.557**
(0.268)
-1.774***
(0.0921)
1.890***
(0.0869)
-1.121***
(0.0993)

-0.0962
(0.283)
-0.325***
(0.0497)
0.572***
(0.0476)
-0.997***
(0.0762)

-0.941***
(0.0125)
-1.14e-05***
(4.86e-07)
-0.184***
(0.0175)
-0.314***
(0.0194)
-0.0418***
(0.00322)
0.0185***
(0.00253)
-0.0688***
(0.0122)

-0.824***
(0.00946)
-9.68e-06***
(3.74e-07)
-0.166***
(0.0131)
-0.323***
(0.0137)
0.0973***
(0.00249)
0.0167***
(0.00191)
0.00490
(0.00942)

-0.875***
(0.0295)
-2.34e-05***
(1.25e-06)
-0.0715
(0.0451)
-0.192***
(0.0495)
-0.279***
(0.0340)
0.0320***
(0.00798)
-0.0168***
(0.00636)

-0.517***
(0.0178)
-2.70e-05***
(8.50e-07)
-0.0765***
(0.0263)
-0.155***
(0.0268)
-0.0632***
(0.0201)
0.162***
(0.00461)
0.0134***
(0.00351)

-0.425***
(0.0420)
-2.31e-05***
(1.56e-06)
-0.319***
(0.0460)
-0.466***
(0.0586)
0.175***
(0.0396)
-0.0168**
(0.00700)
0.00784
(0.00806)

0.0167
(0.0299)
-3.21e-05***
(1.31e-06)
-0.167***
(0.0388)
-0.216***
(0.0435)
0.494***
(0.0336)
0.100***
(0.00585)
-0.0323***
(0.00619)

Table A1. Results of Conditional Logit Analysis Cardiac Admissions (continued)
Market:
Phoenix
Tuscon
Service:
Surgical
Medical
Surgical
Medical
Patient Diagnosis-Hospital Service Offerings Interactions
Cardiac Catheterization
1.049***
3.343***
(0.0520)
(1.039)
Stent*Open Heart Surgery
0.611***
0.884***
(0.0240)
(0.0733)
Open Heart Surgery
1.830***
0.961***
(0.0336)
(0.0847)
Patient Diagnosis-System Service Offerings Interactions
Cardiac Catheterization
0.0265***
0.0225*
(0.00457)
(0.0132)
Stent*Open Heart Surgery
-0.0317***
0.0374**
(0.00492)
(0.0154)
Open Heart Surgery
0.0141***
-0.341***
(0.00545)
(0.0191)
Hospital Fixed Effects * Ln(Drive Time)
Hospital 2
-0.0102*
-0.0646***
-0.0243***
-0.194***
(0.00605)
(0.00554)
(0.00645)
(0.00553)
Hospital 3
-0.102***
-0.0529***
-0.0210
0.0254
(0.00862)
(0.00691)
(0.0266)
(0.0161)
Hospital 4
0.221***
0.0211***
-1.625***
-1.462***
(0.00607)
(0.00543)
(0.0799)
(0.0830)
Hospital 5
-0.281***
0.103***
-0.240***
-0.431***
(0.0193)
(0.00801)
(0.00788)
(0.0233)
Hospital 6
0.104***
0.0244***
-0.189***
-0.145***
(0.00624)
(0.00621)
(0.00741)
(0.0158)
Hospital 7
-0.225***
-0.164***
-0.0919***
-0.192***
(0.00956)
(0.00793)
(0.0307)
(0.0195)

Denver
Surgical

Medical

-0.127*
(0.0749)
0.397***
(0.147)
0.0753
(0.0613)
-0.0626***
(0.0104)
-0.0838***
(0.0233)
-0.00977
(0.0216)
-0.375***
(0.0146)
-0.218***
(0.0145)
-0.0466***
(0.0121)
-0.193***
(0.0138)
0.0750***
(0.00941)
-0.338***
(0.0152)

-0.273***
(0.0117)
-0.393***
(0.0164)
-0.186***
(0.0120)
-0.254***
(0.0133)
-0.935***
(0.0301)
0.0215***
(0.00701)

Table A1. Results of Conditional Logit Analysis Cardiac Admissions (continued)
Market:
Phoenix
Tuscon
Service:
Surgical
Medical
Surgical
Medical
Hospital Fixed Effects * Ln(Drive Time)
Hospital 8
-0.0756***
-0.116***
0.272***
-0.208***

Hospital 9
Hospital 10
Hospital 11
Hospital 12
Hospital 13
Hospital 14
Hospital 15
Hospital 16
Hospital 17
Hospital 18
Hospital 19
Hospital 20

(0.00790)
-0.310***
(0.0108)
-0.00463
(0.00738)
0.0363***
(0.00854)
0.0687***
(0.0143)
-0.261***
(0.00820)
0.222***
(0.00693)
0.117***
(0.0103)
-0.122***
(0.00747)
-0.151***
(0.0160)
-0.0162
(0.0121)
0.125***
(0.00777)
-0.243***
(0.0124)

(0.00658)
-0.0319***
(0.00676)
0.0541***
(0.0116)
-0.206***
(0.00727)
-0.181***
(0.00730)
-0.295***
(0.0152)
-0.0570***
(0.00813)
-0.153***
(0.0109)
-0.315***
(0.00712)
0.0176**
(0.00683)
-0.154***
(0.00997)
-0.115***
(0.00609)
-0.328***
(0.0128)

(0.0154)
-0.112***
(0.00614)

(0.00555)
-0.00896**
(0.00454)
-0.131***
(0.0192)
0.194***
(0.0140)
-0.0967***
(0.00501)
-0.308***
(0.0220)

Denver
Surgical

Medical

-0.221***

-0.401***

(0.0140)
-0.216***
(0.0124)
-0.287***
(0.0139)
-0.259***
(0.0619)
-0.327***
(0.0167)
0.0866***
(0.0109)
-0.400***
(0.0185)
-0.830***
(0.0434)

(0.0151)
-0.286***
(0.0128)
-0.264***
(0.0119)
-0.318***
(0.0133)
-0.164**
(0.0664)
-0.346***
(0.0144)
0.0753***
(0.00965)
-0.267***
(0.0138)
-0.544***
(0.0203)

Table A1. Results of Conditional Logit Analysis Cardiac Admissions (continued)
Market:
Phoenix
Tuscon
Service:
Surgical
Medical
Surgical
Medical
Hospital Fixed Effects * Ln(Drive Time)
Hospital 21
0.0110
-0.00662
(0.00733)
(0.00880)
Hospital 22
-0.287***
-0.350***
(0.0162)
(0.00853)
Hospital 23
-0.307***
-0.438***
(0.0174)
(0.0111)
Hospital 24
-0.256***
-0.224***
(0.00807)
(0.00731)
Hospital 25
-0.0553***
-0.224***
(0.00707)
(0.0105)
Hospital 26
0.0194***
-0.157***
(0.00667)
(0.0103)
Hospital 27
-0.530***
-0.250***
(0.0324)
(0.00655)
Hospital 28
-0.00371
-0.0398***
(0.00668)
(0.00573)
Hospital 29
-0.309***
0.00656
(0.0180)
(0.00519)
Hospital 30
-0.313***
(0.00990)
Hospital 31
0.00817
(0.00548)
Hospital 32
-0.112***
(0.0102)
Observations
Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

2234621

2376325

195349

415210

Denver
Surgical

Medical

332565

341968

